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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 002130

SIPDIS

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DEPT. FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/DSS/CC, DS/OSAC,  
DS/OPO/FPD, DS/IP/SPC/MSG, CA/OCS, NEA/EX, NEA/ARPI

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TAGS: [AEMR](#) [ASEC](#) [AMGT](#) [PTER](#) [CASC](#) [KHLs](#) [MU](#) [EAC](#)

SUBJECT: EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 12/07/2004

REF: A. SECSTATE 259800

[1](#)B. MUSCAT 2125

Classified By: DCM William R. Stewart.  
Reason: 1.4(c)(g).

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Summary  
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[1](#)1. (SBU) Summary: The Ambassador convened the Emergency Action Committee December 7 to review updated reporting on yesterday's terrorist attack against Consulate General Jeddah. After a careful review of the facts surrounding the attack, the EAC discussed existing countermeasures and avenues for further mitigating the threat of a similar attack. EAC members noted no new threat reporting specific to Oman, and concurred that there have been no substantive changes in previously reported assessments of the local security and threat environments (reftel B). The EAC will continue to meet and report regularly. End Summary.

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Review  
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[1](#)2. (C) The Ambassador convened the Emergency Action Committee ("EAC") December 7 to review updated reporting on yesterday's terrorist attack against Consulate General Jeddah. The meeting opened with a discussion of the known facts, including the contents of reftel A. The EAC further discussed existing countermeasures, such as operating procedures for the Chancery vehicle entrance's double set of anti-ram vehicle gates and Delta barriers, and their control via both Post One and a 15-minute FEBR local guard booth. To mitigate the threat to security, motorpool, facilities, and other staff performing functions in or adjacent to the motorpool, which lies between the aforementioned sets of gates/barriers, the EAC agreed on the necessity of creating an alternate safehaven in the carpenter shop (accessible via the motorpool). The alternate safehaven would provide cover for staff who, based on the circumstances, might be caught in the motorpool between the two sets of barriers and be unable to escape attack through the Chancery hard-line. The EAC further agreed on the necessity of scheduling an Embassy-wide combined intruder/safehaven drill.

[1](#)3. (S/NF) As previously reported (reftel B), immediately following the attack against Consulate General Jeddah, RSO requested ramped-up Royal Oman Police (ROP) coverage at both the Chancery and in residential neighborhoods; RMAS did the same via their Omani government counterparts. Marine Security Guard, Surveillance Detection Unit, and local guard personnel were also briefed accordingly.

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MSGQ  
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[1](#)4. (C) Specifically addressing the Marine Security Guard Quarters (MSGQ), a low-visibility, nondescript -- but not unknown -- residence located in a residential neighborhood approximately four miles from the Chancery, the EAC recommended and agreed to immediately increase guard coverage from one to two guards. The augmentation will enhance access control of the MSGQ, by allowing one guard to monitor the street and approaching pedestrian/vehicle traffic, while the other manually operates the pedestrian and/or vehicle gates. RSO will coordinate this EAC decision with DS/OPO/FPD. NOTE: Currently, the MSGQ maintains only one 24/7 guard position. This guard must single-handedly control access, screen visitors and vehicles, and monitor CCTV monitors. The guard is therefore unable to rove, take hygiene breaks, or respond to emergencies or other security-related requests for assistance without leaving his post. In addition, the guard relies heavily on the Surveillance Detection Unit to respond to calls for assistance, as there is no daytime roving patrol. END NOTE.

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## Conclusion

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15. (S/NF) After carefully consideration, and noting no new threat reporting specific to Oman, the EAC concluded that there has been no substantive change in the local security environment, and that the Embassy's FPCON and already heightened security posture remains appropriate. The EAC remains acutely aware of the need to monitor both the regional and local security situation, and is prepared to take the necessary countermeasures should changes to either occur. AMB, DCM, RSO, ARSO, RMAS, P/E, PAO, CONS, MGT, MSG, DAO, OMC (USDR), and ECA (USCENTAF) participated in the meeting.  
BALTIMORE